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Constituency development funds (CDFs) are 
attracting an increasing level of academic attention 
internationally (see Baskin and Mezey 2014). To 
date, work done on CDFs in the Pacific, and in Sol-
omon Islands specifically, has lagged behind work 
done on Africa, South Asia and other regions. This 
is anomalous given that 2015 has seen CDFs in 
Solomon Islands rise to historically — indeed glob-
ally — high levels. This In Brief outlines the current 
state of play on CDFs in Solomon Islands, and sug-
gests areas for further research.
CDFs in Solomon Islands: A World-Beater
The 2015 budget, brought down in April of this year, 
provides for the largest CDF allocation, in absolute 
and proportional terms, in Solomon Islands’ history. 
Within the development budget the core CDF, the 
Constituency Development Program, is budgeted at 
SBD260 million (USD32m). This is supplemented 
by Taiwanese grant funding for the same program of 
SBD70m. In addition, the development budget pro-
vides for a Constituency Water and Sanitation Pro-
gram (SBD21m), a Constituency Renewable Rural 
Electrification Program (SBD5.16m), and an allo-
cation for ‘Constituency Ships’ (SBD30m). Taken 
together these various budget lines amount to some 
SBD386m (USD47.6m), just over one third of the 
consolidated development budget.
Additionally, two lines in the recurrent budget 
provide for MP-controlled funds: the MPs Discre-
tionary Fund Grant (SBD25m) and the MP Schol-
arship Award Grant (SBD15m). Grossed up, MP 
allocations from the development and recurrent 
budgets amount to some SBD426m, equivalent to 
just over 12 per cent of total budgeted expenditure 
for 2015, or SBD8.5m (USD1m) per MP.
Moreover, there is reason to believe other budg-
et lines within the development budget are in fact 
managed through MPs as CDFs, even though they 
are not identified as such. It is possible the above 
figures understate CDF allocations for 2015 by 
about a quarter, or around SBD2.5m per MP, which 
would bring CDF allocations to around 45 per cent 
of the development budget.
These uncertainties aside, the trends are clear: 
CDFs in Solomon Islands are growing steadily both 
in dollar terms, and as a proportion of budget outlays. 
Indeed, the comparative literature (Baskin and Mezey 
2014) suggests Solomon Islands may be something of 
an outlier internationally in terms of the proportion 
of budget outlays allocated for CDFs, and even in 
terms of the absolute dollar amount allocated per MP.
Solomon Islands is also an outlier in terms of the 
relative absence of governance arrangements in place 
for CDFs (Baskin and Mezey 2014). The 2013 Con-
stituency Development Funds Act remains the first 
and only legislation specifically covering CDFs. The 
Act is notably shorter and less detailed than compa-
rable legislation in other parts of the world. Support-
ing regulations have been drafted but not yet issued. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests, in the absence of any-
thing other than basic accounting requirements, MPs 
develop their own systems for managing CDF funds.
Understanding the Role and Impact of CDFs in 
Solomon Islands
Public discussion and debate about CDFs in Solomon 
Islands reflect themes familiar from the experience 
of CDFs elsewhere around the world: issues around 
transparency, accountability, corruption and waste, 
effectiveness, the proper role of MPs, and the extent 
to which CDFs influence political behaviour — both 
that of voters at elections and that of MPs in Solomon 
Islands’ fluid parliamentary system (Fraenkel 2011).
A recent World Bank report (World Bank 2014) 
comprises perhaps the most up-to-date and com-
prehensive analysis of the performance of CDFs in 
Solomon Islands (alongside smaller, centrally man-
aged community programs). The report draws on 
both local expertise and that of individuals involved 
in implementing and monitoring CDFs in Kenya 
and Jamaica. In rating the performance of Solomon 
Islands’ CDF the report finds the key measure on 
which it performs well is the speed at which funds 
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are disbursed. Against other criteria — efficiency 
and effectiveness; accountability, transparency and 
dispute management; and sustainability — the CDF 
performs poorly.
One of the issues addressed in the academic lit-
erature is the question of whether CDFs can play 
a positive role in linking MPs to their constituents 
and, by extension, in processes of democratisa-
tion and broader state formation. To some extent 
these questions are reflected in the scant literature 
on CDFs in Solomon Islands, which dwells on the 
weakness of the formal state apparatus and the effect 
that CDFs have had on the effective and stable func-
tioning of the state. Fraenkel (2011) is unequivocal 
in seeing CDFs as inconsistent with strengthened 
state capacity. He cautions donors against ‘endors-
ing the kinds of analyses that depict such schemes 
as potentially positive instruments for improving 
the functioning of states’. While noting the corrosive 
effect of CDFs on the state, Craig and Porter (2013) 
also ask — albeit tentatively — whether institution-
alisation of CDF arrangements may ‘in time provide 
a stable, effective provisioning system that is gradu-
ally folded into mainstream state mechanisms’.
Good Questions  — But Where’s the Evidence?
One of the most distinctive characteristics of Solo-
mon Islands’ CDFs is the enormous gaps in our 
knowledge about: how CDFs are managed by MPs 
and their staff on a day-to-day basis; how effec-
tive and sustainable CDF expenditure is; public 
attitudes and expectations; the impact of CDFs on 
voter behaviour; the attitudes of MPs themselves. 
The World Bank report makes the point that ‘there 
is very little information as to how [CDF] funds are 
used, at all levels of government and society’. There is 
also widespread ignorance among ordinary Solomon 
Islanders about the workings of the CDF. One conse-
quence of this is that much commentary on CDFs in 
Solomon Islands is poorly supported by evidence.
Reflecting this, one newspaper (Solomon Star 
1/9/2015) recently reported as a ‘staggering revela-
tion’ news — theoretically freely available to all 
Solomon Islanders — that CDFs totalled SBD334m 
a year. In fact, the figure is at least SBD100m higher 
than this: possibly more.
Public awareness is one of the key issues being 
addressed in a two-year (2015–16) project, the CDF 
Community Audit, currently being undertaken by 
Transparency Solomon Islands with funding from 
the UN Democracy Fund. The project is aimed 
at raising awareness of CDFs and raising demand 
for accountability from MPs. The project has not 
released data to date but will be gathering valuable 
evidence from communities that may be highly rel-
evant for future research in this field.
Better evidence is important, first and foremost 
for the citizens of Solomon Islands, on whose behalf 
CDFs are spent. Better evidence may get us closer to 
understanding the political impact of CDFs and their 
effect on state-formation. It may also be a means of 
changing the nature of the dialogue between Solo-
mon Islands governments and donors on this subject. 
For many years this has been a dialogue of the deaf: 
donor opposition to CDFs has gained no traction, 
while the CDF budget has grown inexorably. At a 
time when Solomon Islands’ largest donor, Australia, 
is keen to pilot innovative approaches to develop-
ment, better evidence about CDFs could assist in 
designing fresh and more effective approaches to it.
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